Implementing a Central Bank Issued Digital Currency with Economic Implications Considerations by Mohamed, Hazik
 
 
IJIEF:International Journal of Islamic Economics and Finance 
Vol. 3 (1), pg 51-74, January 2020 
 
 
Implementing a Central Bank Issued Digital Currency 
with Economic Implications Considerations 
 
Hazik Mohamed 
Stellar Consulting Group, Singapore, hazik@stellarcg.com 
 
 
Article History 
Received: November 27, 2019 Revised:  December 20, 2019 Accepted: January 7, 2020 
 
 
 Abstract 
 
A central bank-issued digital currency (CBDC) could solve the volatility of a privately-
issued cryptocurrency as well as keep intact its potential benefits. This research 
intended to analyze the possibilities for implementing a CBDC in a viable format that is 
also Shariah-compliant which may have the capacity to tackle issues plaguing the 
current financial system.  
 
We discuss possible scenarios and the resulting impact and consequences of CBDC 
implementation, through a deep examination of the benefits, opportunities, costs and 
issues of several conceptual formats. Methodologically, we used qualitative, 
comparative and analytical assessments on the critical impact on crucial levers like 
dilution to monetary policy, and the stability of the financial system.  
 
Finally, we found that the best format was a non-interest bearing CBDC for the 
interbank settlement and wholesale payment systems which would have the least 
disruption to the economy but strongest monetary policy transmission. 
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I. Introduction 
Customarily, the central authority that provides banks and other monetary 
organizations with electronic accounts for its functionality in the financial 
system is the Central Bank (CB). The public does not have such access and is 
only permitted to keep CB money in physical forms (i.e. coins and/or notes). 
If a CB would issue a universal CBDC, all stakeholders (regardless if they are 
individuals, firms, institutions, governments and central banks) “could store 
assets and make payments using the Central Bank-issued digital currency” 
(Cerqueira et al., 2017). In consequence, this could have important shifts and 
repercussions for financial stability, monetary policy and the relation of 
economic actors to the financial system. There are not many papers in the 
literature (although there are some CBs already conducting research and 
pilot projects) that “address questions on the feasibility of a CBDC 
implementation, its impact on monetary policy, the financial sector and the 
economy” (Danezis and Meiklejohn, 2015; Rogoff, 2016; Barrdear and 
Kumhof, 2016). However, these research are descriptive or focused on 
regulatory frameworks and legal implications, while others are unable to 
define clear use cases and as a result confuse the implications of a possible 
CBDC deployment. The possible lack of actual implementation is due to the 
significant disruption caused to the existing monetary system without a clear 
understanding of its consequences and subsequent impacts. 
 
1.1. Objective 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the possibilities for implementing a 
CBDC in a viable format which is also Shariah-compliant that may have the 
capacity to tackle issues plaguing the current financial system. We discuss 
the possible scenarios and the resulting impact of CBDC on financial markets, 
monetary policy, on consumers, SMEs, banks and even central bank 
independence. In each format discussed, we describe the benefits, costs and 
incentives faced by stakeholders and end each format section with our 
assessment on the probability of adoption. Based on the four scenarios 
described in Cerqueira et al. (2017), we study the implications of each CBDC 
format. These formats are assessed separately in sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 
broken down by their nature and projected impact, consequences and 
possible adoption assessment in terms of cost-benefit, feasibility and their 
overall effect on financial stability. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Background Theory 
Cash is a financial instrument and tangible asset that exhibits four attributes: 
(i) it is anonymous (ii) it is universal (anyone can take possession); (iii) it is 
exchanged between individuals (or “peer-to-peer”, without involvement of a 
central authority or the issuer) and (iv) it does not produce any interest by 
itself. CBDC is a digital alternative to cash that is also decentralized, but it 
gives more flexibility in the treatment of the other three features: 
• They can be anonymous (like cash) i.e. the idea of token–based 
CBDCs, or identifiable (non-anonymous like current accounts) like 
account–based CBDCs. 
• They can be unrestricted (universal) or restricted to a particular set 
of users. Likewise, distributed ledger (DL)-based tokens can be public 
(open) or private (closed), for instance, limited to banks or financial 
institutions. 
• They can be designed to pay or not give returns (in absence of 
interest).  
 
These options can be melded in different ways to generate useful formats of 
CBDCs for practical applications. Such amalgamation for purposeful solutions 
may involve these objectives: (i) to enhance the operations of wholesale 
payment systems; (ii) to replace or support cash with a more proficient 
substitute; (iii) to broaden and enrich tools for monetary policy transmission, 
particularly in overcoming the zero lower bound and (iv) to strengthen 
overall financial stability by decreasing the occurrences of banking and 
financial crises. 
 
2.2. Previous Studies 
Some earlier investigations found during the literature review attempted to 
understand the viability of a centrally-issued cryptocurrency and its possible 
implementation, its impact on monetary policy, and the subsequent effects 
on financial stability and the economy. Danezis and Meiklejohn (2015) noted 
that decentralization through a cryptocurrency has its benefits, such as 
independence from political control, but they also realized considerable 
constraints in terms of computational costs and scalability. 
 
Rogoff (2016) in his Curse of Cash suggested to reduce the circulation of 
cash which, according to his findings, is “feeding tax evasion, corruption, 
terrorism, the drug trade, human trafficking, and the rest of a massive global 
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underground economy”. He also showed that “paper money can also cripple 
monetary policy” due to falling interest rates (below zero) and still unable to 
stimulate the economy. In another study, Dyson and Hodgson (2016) 
recommend “an Indirect Access approach, in which a central bank 
(specifically the Bank of England) would still create and hold the digital cash, 
but all payment and customer services would operate through ‘Digital Cash 
Accounts’ (DCAs) provided by (or ‘administered’ by) private sector firms”. 
Fung and Halaburda (2016) proposed a “framework for assessing why a 
central bank should consider issuing a digital currency and how to 
implement it to improve the efficiency of the retail payment system”. 
 
However, these research are descriptive or focused on regulatory 
frameworks and legal implications, while others are unable to define clear 
use cases and as a result confuse the implications of a possible CBDC 
deployment. 
 
We have also focused our research on central bank-issued digital currencies 
because non-central bank-issued currencies have been volatile and do not 
make a good medium of exchange (unit of account and store of value too) 
when the value fluctuates quite drastically.  Furthermore, cryptocurrencies 
are not legal tender if not issued by the central bank. 
 
 
2.3. Conceptual Framework 
For the purposes of discussion, the assumption is that the possible CBDC 
formats are maintained at a 1:1 parity with cash already in the economy. 
This assumption is held for all formats under discussion as uneven parity 
would create a series of aggravations and too many probabilities to ascertain 
any practical assessment. 
Table 1. The four formats that are discussed in this research. 
Format Use Case Characteristics 
1 CBDC as a Sovereign Currency 
(similar to Cash/Fiat) 
Anonymous, universally-accepted 
and non-interest bearing 
2 CBDC as Public Deposit in 
Central Bank 
Identified (non-anonymous), 
universally-accepted and non-
interest bearing 
3 CBDC as a Monetary Policy 
Instrument 
Anonymous, universally-accepted 
and interest bearing 
4 CBDC for Interbank Settlement Identified, restricted use and non-
interest bearing 
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III. Methodology 
The methodology employed for this investigation into the four different use 
cases for the CBDC is a qualitative one, where we seek to determine its 
variation in application impact and to understand the relationships of each 
of the four formats with respect to being a cash substitute, their impact on 
monetary policy, on operations of wholesale payment systems and on the 
overall stability of the economic system. 
 
3.1. Model Development 
As we are still in early stages of consideration for a CBDC issuance and 
possible implementation, this research has adopted an overview approach 
to first qualitatively assess the critical impact on crucial levers like monetary 
policy, and the stability of the financial system as a result of the shifts from 
digital transformation. Although in section 5, we discussed Barrdear and 
Kumhof’s (2016) investigations on the properties of a specific format of 
CBDC (Format 3 as described in section 4.3) using the DSGE model on the 
countercyclical monetary policy measures and interactions with fiscal policy, 
we felt that our approach provides a foundational understanding for the 
reader to grasp the different aspects of how the digital currency can be 
utilized to solve certain limitations to traditional policy instruments, and how 
introducing something new may impact the economy and in what way. This 
is particularly useful for policy-makers and central bankers who are 
unfamiliar with blockchain technology. 
 
3.2. Method of Assessment 
In order to assess CBDCs as cash substitute, their impact on monetary policy, 
on operations of wholesale payment systems and on the overall stability of 
the banking and financial systems, we had to qualitatively trace the 
repercussions that would result from such changes, with considerations to 
the current interactions with the existing cash, bank deposits and electronic 
money environment. As such each of the four formats will be assessed in 
three ways: by its expected impact, consequences, and adoption 
assessment. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
4.1. The CBDC as a Sovereign Currency (like Cash/Fiat Currency) 
This CBDC format retains all four features of cash: anonymity, peer to peer 
(P2P), universality, and non-yield bearing. Banks would remain as its creators 
and maintain their inimitability at keeping reserves at the CB. Yves Mersch 
(2017) of the ECB, defined this CBDC format as “value-based” in collocation 
to an “account based” CBDC (analyzed later in Format 2 in section 4.4.2). 
Anonymity in CBDCs would have the same issues with security and safety as 
cash. Like cash, stolen CBDCs would be hard to recover once stolen or lost, 
although CBDCs would be less likely to be stolen or lost than cash. P2P 
exchangeability allows its exchange between counterparties without 
intermediaries. Universality means that anybody can take possession of it, 
use and store it. Finally, this CBDC would not bear any yield just like cash. 
 
4.1.1. Impact and Consequences 
By virtue of the essential functions of money ― ”unit of account, medium of 
exchange and store of value”―the performance of the CBDC is assessed in 
the following paragraphs in relation to the most pertinent kinds of money: 
“bank deposits, cash and other private/foreign currencies”. 
As a “unit of account”, the CBDC would be comparable to that of physical 
cash, as long as they remained pegged to each other1. This format is superior 
to private and foreign currencies because this CBDC currency would be 
digital hence effortlessly traded online. While current fiat currencies would 
remain vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations on top of the risk of capital 
controls, the CBDC would not. 
As a “medium of exchange”, this CBDC format would both compete and 
complement both cash and bank deposits. However, it would remain an 
imperfect and also uncertain substitute for both because of required access 
and internet connection. Undoubtedly, its usage would increase as people 
become more familiar with online transactions and are more technologically 
savvy. Also, because it would retain anonymity2, this format would not curb 
illicit transactions. “Compared to bank deposits, this format would facilitate 
                                                          
1   The implementation of this CBDC format would be like issuing a new “coin” or “note”, although this 
note would be digital hence effortlessly traded online and infinitely divisible. 
2   This format could even enable unlawful activities, as moving money becomes cheaper and easier than 
cash, although this may be unlikely considering that it is CB-issued, and there is a possibility of 
overturning anonymity in exceptional cases. 
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long-distance and/or large-quantity payments, but it would not necessarily 
offer additional services3”. Furthermore, “it would facilitate the offering of 
such services by firms other than banks―fintech companies and small 
players―thus further commoditizing the payment infrastructure and 
reducing the comparative advantage of deposits” (BIS, 2015). 
In its function as a “store of value”, CBDC persist to be riskier than bank 
deposits (in this format), at least up to the amount guaranteed by 
authorities. With no traceability, anonymity becomes a liability if it were 
stolen, lost or the password (to the wallet) forgotten. According to 
Broadbent (2016), “if all CBDC did was to substitute for cash .... people 
would probably still want to keep most of their money in commercial banks” 
simply because it is familiar and there is a custodian for safe-keeping. 
The introduction of this format would impede cash usage and potentially 
diminish (but not severely) bank deposits. Physical cash would still dominate 
in economies where transactions are cash-driven but in increasingly cashless 
societies where cash transactions are dwindling, CBDCs would swiftly replace 
cash. 
As a means of exchange, the total advantages of this format would 
compensate for its costs. CBDC in this format is digital cash without the 
volatility and price instability of current non-government crypto-currencies, 
such as Bitcoin (BTC), Ethereum (Ether), Ripple (XRP). The advantages of 
currencies like Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple is in the faster money transfers 
(and cheaper too) that would also benefit CBDC holders by turning these 
advantages to productive gains (Barrdear and Kumhof, 2016). Financial 
inclusion can be advanced, especially where it is difficult for banks to 
establish branches due to geographical remoteness or where physical cash 
are ineffective compared to digital versions (IMF, 2019). In ASEAN, the 
ASEAN Financial Innovation Network (AFIN) “aims to facilitate broader 
adoption of fintech innovation and development in the region”. According to 
a January 2019 from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS, 2019), 70% 
of central banks (based on 63 central banks that participated in the survey) 
are currently researching the issuance of a CBDC. The majority of the 
countries currently investigating to launch of a digital currency, cited 
‘financial inclusion’ as the main reason for exploring CBDCs. 
For consumers and businesses, transactional settlements and fund transfers 
become faster and cheaper since accessibility becomes easy to perform 
these transactions (Cerqueira et al., 2017). This feature is particularly useful 
for developing countries, as remote and rural areas have accessibility 
                                                          
3   It is highly unlikely that CBs would provide FI-type financial services, despite certain types of services 
can be inherent to a CBDC through a tech-centric platform as opposed to a bank-centric one. 
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challenges. Savings would also be improved since the CBDC as an instrument 
would allow money to be stored effortlessly. 
Also, the gains would likely outweigh the outlays for central banks and 
monetary authorities. Higher efficiency gains would be obtained from 
emerging markets with high inflation, where maintenance and issuance of 
physical cash have become costly. Furthermore, this format will aid 
monetary authorities to become competitive and limit the use of private or 
foreign digital currencies which they do not control. Importantly, CBDC 
strengthens monetary policy transmission mechanism in that it brings the 
latter closer in line with the objectives of monetary policy. However, the 
authorities will have to bear all the costs required to implement and 
maintain the new infrastructure along with first hand equipment and the 
hiring and training of new skills. 
Unfortunately for the banking industry, the expense will exceed the gains. 
The CBDC would make intermediaries (like banks) for payment transactions 
unnecessary, ending the payment business4 for banks. The payment services 
would then be just an auxiliary part of an encompassing service of financial 
management. 
Due to the partial substitution of CBDC for deposits, banks´ credit business 
would deteriorate too. As the volume of deposits drops, so does the money 
multiplier. Also, as the deposits in the banking system fall, their volatility 
increases due to wealth reallocation from deposits into a broader range of 
riskier alternatives. With increased volatility, asset and liability management 
by banks would become more intricate. In addition, the banks would lose 
critical data that they use to draw up credit scores based on consumer 
wealth and repayment behaviors. 
The potential benefits for banks would likely arise from the easing of banking 
regulations as the sector become less strenuous and their activities become 
less disruptive to the financial system. Potential benefits might ensue from 
new business opportunities facilitated by CBDC, such as the management 
and protection of the keys for CBDC wallets, although it is more likely that 
this will be adopted by banks themselves. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4   Faced with bank fees (no matter how minimal), even people who prefer traditional accounts would 
consider converting their deposits to frictionless CBDC for more efficient payments. International 
transfers are already affected. 
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4.1.2. Adoption Assessment 
The elimination of cash, or at least a partial elimination as suggested by 
Rogoff (2016) is always an option, and only low-denomination bills and coins 
are preserved. Such possibility is particularly significant under this format, as 
the CBDC replaces physical cash, although in high amounts only. 
It would be easier to eradicate cash in developed economies where most 
transactions are already digitalized, but in cash-dependent economies, it is 
more challenging. Eliminating cash could save bank fees but create other 
costs for end users, although they would enjoy social benefits from the 
reduction in unlawful transactions. Although the CBDC remains anonymous, 
there is a possibility that obscurity can be reversed at any point for AML/CTF 
investigation purposes. Such possibility makes this CBDC format unappealing 
for illicit activities, like tax evasion, etc. 
Using CBDC in this format equates to enhanced efficiency in payments and 
money transfers, reducing transactional costs. For the finance industry, as 
security measures to safeguard e-wallets (on top of safeguarding 
passwords), new businesses could emerge based on this type of service. The 
reduction in deposits will cause an immediate drop in the amount of credit 
granted or an increase in the cost of credit, if there are no CB compensatory 
measures or stabilization policy. In such a scenario, financial stability and the 
credit markets may be negatively affected. 
 
4.2. The CBDC as Public Deposit in Central Bank 
This format generates a very disruptive configuration of CBDC because it 
proposes an identifiable money which is non-anonymous. Practically, 
“having a CBDC held by the general public is the equivalent of keeping a 
deposit in the central bank, so that the authority’s power to supervise and 
monitor it would be substantially greater than it is today” (Cerqueira et al., 
2017). Being identifiable and non-anonymous, non-compliant activities can 
be detected. As a deterrent and a regulatory tool in combating illegal 
activities, it would require the eventual elimination cash and limit the use of 
alternative assets for this CBDC format to be absolutely effective, which is 
not easy to do. Two possible scenarios for the adoption of a CBDC with these 
characteristics have two main differentiating and important elements.  
In the first scenario, particularly in countries where there is a high volume of 
illegal activities―such as attempts to launder money and evade 
taxes―makes the adoption of this CBDC format useful for the government. 
In the second scenario, CBDC as a recognized conversion of deposits in the 
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banking system into deposits in the Central Bank, can offer greater financial 
stability to the country.  
However, the consequent reduction in bank deposits would shrink credit 
markets significantly, as falling bank deposits would mean that credit 
creation becomes severely limited. Since every deposit would be accounted 
against sovereign wealth (i.e. cash, central bank reserves and government 
securities), this format facilitates a full-reserve banking (FRB) system. FRB 
endeavors to “separate the payments system from the financing system as 
well as monetary policy from credit policy” (Laina, 2015). Preventing private 
money creation would ensure financial stability as initially proposed in the 
UK Bank Charter Act of 1844, the US Acts of 1863 and 1864, the Chicago 
Plan of 1930s forbade “private money creation through fractional-reserve 
banking by requiring that bank notes (which were the prevailing means of 
payment) should be fully-backed by government money”. This format opens 
a discussion on allocating government-backed liquidity and the conditions 
that the CB could benchmark to build up liquidity in the banking system with 
framework adjustments for reserves and/or open market transactions. 
 
4.2.1. Impact and Consequences 
A non-anonymous CBDC format would make it less appealing than cash as a 
medium of exchange, at least for some. But the demand will rise for such 
CBDCs as it is a more efficient means of exchange. In comparison with other 
CBDC formats namely as a sovereign currency (Format 1 discussed in section 
1.0) and as a monetary policy tool (Format 3 discussed in section 4.3.), this 
format would be less desirable as an exchange medium. 
However, as a store of value, this CBDC format would be highly desirable 
because it is a safer form of money as compared to other formats. It will be a 
safer from technological issues and because it is identifiable (non-
anonymous), it will be easier to recover in cases of loss, theft, etc. Moreover, 
it will be a safer than bank deposits, as the maintenance risks at the CB are 
clearly lower than as deposits in a bank. Some would still demand bank 
deposits due to higher remuneration and services, but banks would prefer 
higher credit levels in a fractional reserve system for higher profitability. 
Deposits at the CB are much safer than bank deposits, among other things, 
because they do not bear any credit risk. Due to that feature of CBDC 
deposits, this is comparable to keeping deposits in a purported “narrow-
bank” model, i.e. in a “financial institution that is compelled by authorities to 
maintain the public’s resources under custody in a liquid and safe form, such 
as in government bonds, rather than leveraging on them in order to create 
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credit” (Kotlikoff, 2010). This would likely lead to a narrow-banking system 
due to CB accepting CBDC deposits and making CBDC non-anonymous. 
Despite having this format and the CB functioning broadly as a narrow-bank, 
existing banks will continue to function as “fractional-reserve banking” 
models, i.e. “transforming part of the public’s deposits into credit and 
keeping only a fraction of them as reserves”. In this way, we can refer to this 
format as a partial limited-purpose banking system, as opposed to a full 
narrow-banking system where financial institutions are also required to 
operate as stable narrow-banks rather than as fractional-reserve banks that 
is less stable systemically. 
From the monetary authority perspective, the demand increase for CBDC 
equates to the increase in the size of the CB’s liabilities, hence increasing the 
size of its balance sheet. The CB will then increase its assets through 
purchase of predominantly safe and liquid assets, such as GDP-linked bonds, 
treasury bills and public securities, to counterbalance CBDC deposits, in 
order to match the increase in its liabilities. 
 
4.2.2. Adoption Assessment 
CBDC in this format will “work as a proper unit of account, like cash and bank 
deposits, and in contrast with private and foreign currencies” (Cerqueira et 
al., 2017). In this particular format, “the CBDC will be in general a better 
store of value and a worse medium of exchange” than in other formats, its 
adoption will very much depend on how the government and its people 
value financial stability, safety and anonymity. 
On a cautionary note, the deposits that the CB obtains with a recognized 
CBDC should not be used to either grant loans to the non-financial private 
sector or finance governments. First off, it would be problematic as CB is not 
meant to do so and a non-independent CB could, for example, compete with 
banks for more deposits, and lose its focus on its original objectives as a 
market supervisor and regulator. Although this format may reverberate 
changes to a more financially-sound and stable system, like all systems, its 
moral risks remains. In the guise of improving financial stability, moral 
hazards include unscrupulously generating unreasonable incentives for the 
government, increasing the risks of fiscal slippage, and creating problems for 
the CB with regards to its independence. 
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4.3. The CBDC as a Monetary Policy Tool 
In this format, the proposed digital currency bears semblance to cash (being 
universal and anonymous) in some ways “but with the special feature of 
possibly being interest-bearing” (Cerqueira et al., 2017). “An interest-bearing 
currency as a monetary policy instrument gives the Central Banks autonomy 
to meet their inflation targets, by dropping the nominal value of the digital 
currency”, similar to reducing the interest rates without any lower bound 
(refer to Barrdear and Kumhof (2016) or the following section 5.0). 
Analogously, the nominal value of the CBDC would rise if there is a rise in 
interest rates, causing an increase in the monetary base. In such a format, 
monetary policy would be transmitted directly, thus accelerating the 
transmission of this policy whilst creating unlimited room for action to meet 
inflation targets without having to depend on the banking system as a proxy 
transmission channel to the economy. As a consequence, the effectiveness 
of monetary policy is enhanced considerably. Under the present 
configuration of monetary policy transmission mechanism, the banks have a 
crucial role in the effectiveness of this mechanism. It should be noted that 
the aim of monetary policy is to prompt adjustments in the private sector’s 
portfolio (investment and consumption) in order to achieve stability. 
However, the banking system and monetary policy have two different 
objective functions. The former maximizes profits while the latter’s objective 
is to achieve financial stability to help growth. More often than not, the two 
are in conflict. Current monetary policy relies on the banking system to 
transmit its actions to the private sector to induce it to adjust its portfolio to 
achieve monetary policy objective(s). As the objective of monetary policy 
comes into conflict with that of the banking system, more than likely that 
the banking system will serve its own objectives, thus, reducing the strength 
of monetary policy transmission and thus rendering monetary policy actions 
impotent. As mentioned, CBDC in this format has the capacity to reduce the 
dissonance from the banking system while, concurrently, enhancing the 
power of monetary policy transmission mechanism by directly inducing 
private sector portfolio adjustments. 
 
4.3.1. Impact and Consequences 
It is possible to create CBDC with smart contracts that can change the face 
value of the whole stock of CBDC, effectively transforming the CBDC into an 
interest-bearing currency. An interest-bearing currency would be a radical 
shift that could create possibilities for monetary policy that are currently 
unavailable, and difficult or costly to implement. 
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Being able to change (particularly to decrease) the face value of a national 
digital currency is equivalent to being able to set interest rates as low as is 
required (even as negative as necessary) without being constrained by any 
“zero lower bound”. This would allow CBs to respond assertively against 
recessionary economic pressures. Inversely, increasing the face value of the 
currency will positively cause an expansion in the monetary base. 
However, being able to do it technically does not equate to wanting to do it 
politically or strategically. Empowering CBs to decrease the face value of 
circulating currency can be wickedly construed as expropriation. Although 
expropriation in real terms happens via economic inflation and quite 
regularly too, it is not clear how society would react to a minimal 
sequestration of wealth via monetary policy. In terms of legitimacy, when 
CBs are empowered to vary the face value of circulating currency, it 
effectively tantamount to adjusting the wealth of those holding the 
currency. In the existing economic system, this is traditionally the sanction of 
the fiscal authority, not the monetary authority. By varying interest rates, it 
raises legitimacy issues for CBs to transmit fiscal policies, or at least a new 
discussion on a modified or merged function. Moreover, the currency 
becomes a questionable numeraire5 as a unit of account in the market when 
CBs have control over its face value.  
This CBDC format retains anonymity, P2P and universality. But unlike cash, 
this CBDC format can bear interest. An important point to note is that the 
interest rate of the CBDC can be different from the monetary policy interest 
rate. The different yields could weaken the efficiency of monetary policy 
transmission but, a lower interest rate would afford more flexibility for banks 
to incentivize deposits above the CBDC rate than the official interest rate, 
which could protect both financial stability and credit markets. 
The coexistence of cash and CBDC under this format would be complicated 
and somewhat thorny. If interest rates were negative, people would convert 
their CBDCs to zero-yield physical cash to safeguard its value, and CBDCs 
would logically only sustain significantly negative rates only if all physical 
cash were abolished. If the CBDC bore positive rates instead, then people 
would change their cash into CBDCs, and in doing so, transforming itself to a 
cashless society. 
As in the first format (CBDC as a Sovereign Currency), this “CBDC would 
exhibit advantages in comparison to bank deposits, especially when viewed 
as a medium of exchange without intermediaries” (Cerqueira et al., 2017). 
However, “bank deposits would likely keep their advantage as a store of 
value (better safeguards) and continue attracting those looking for specific 
                                                          
5   an item or commodity acting as a measure of value or as a standard for currency exchange. 
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banking services. As a result, the demand for bank deposits relative to that 
for CBDC would depend on the yield spread between them” that gives better 
value. But intuitively, any volatility would be higher as the spread between 
CBDC and deposits would be fluctuating at both of its margins6. 
In this form, CBDC still competes with other currencies and assets. In 
deciding which form of currency to hold, the value and the perceived 
stability of CBDCs versus other currencies/assets would be crucial in the 
demand for CBDC. Viewed from exchange rates between currencies, it is no 
different to what we have today, where floating rates of currencies coexist 
while preserving their own domestic interest rates. Yet uncertainty-
instability might intensify with negative rates, making CBs forced to impose 
capital controls as a last resort7. 
According to the BIS (2018), “CBDCs are considered an autonomous factor 
for monetary policy implementation for two reasons. First, from the 
viewpoint of the day-to-day steering of the central bank’s balance sheet to 
control short-term interest rates, daily fluctuations in the demand for CBDC 
are an exogenous factor, even though CBDC would be an endogenous factor 
within the broader monetary policy framework. Second, even if CBDC was 
introduced, the amount of digital central bank money held by monetary 
counterparties (reserves) would still be crucial for control over short-term 
interest rates”. 
 
4.3.2. Adoption Assessment 
In principle, this format would allow the CB to implement negative interest 
rates, which would incur losses in value for these CBDC holders, equivalent 
to sequestration. In addition, users can possibly be identified due to 
technological breach or legal requirement, at the costs of still not having 
cash in hand. In addition, any internet disruption or power shortage would 
also magnify the costs of the abolition of cash. Conversely, positive rates 
would be a welcomed option as it would improve CBDC value for the 
holders. 
If cash (sovereign fiats) were to be replaced, authorities would bear the high 
cost of accessibility to this new CBDC, both in educating the global public as 
well as reducing technology barriers concerning its use. Further, it is intuitive 
                                                          
6   As suggested before, CBDC interest rates could be set at a sufficiently low level such as to guarantee 
that demand for bank deposits does not fall significantly, driving credit levels down. 
7   Uncertainty might rise because CBs are only held accountable for keeping inflation under control (and 
their credibility on that front has led to stability in international exchange markets). However, central 
banks are not held accountable for sustaining rates above any level. 
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and important to discuss what the CB’s roles8 and mandates are before 
allowing CBDCs to yield interests, and then to establish a framework to 
correctly incentivize major stakeholders. Further considerations will be made 
to comply to Shariah which forbids interest in Islamic nations. 
Finally, the cross-border payments transactions could be considerably 
diminished by any possible adoption of capital controls. Domestically, 
payment services would practically come to an end with the elimination of 
cash, as in Format 1 (section 4. 1.) which replaces cash. 
 
4.4. The CBDC as Interbank Settlement 
The ”current settlement of payments is costly because it needs strict 
monitoring to avoid any double spending or sudden default. As a result, 
payment systems currently used by CBs are tiered: only Tier1 banks can 
open a settlement account in the CB (which needs to remain continuously 
funded) for immediate settlement purposes. Banks in other tiers have to 
open accounts in Tier1 banks and go through them to settle their transfers in 
the CB. Thus, top-tier banks intermediate other banks’ transfers while also 
managing their own customers’ accounts” (Cerqueira et al., 2017). 
 
Figure 1. Tiered Payment Model versus Distributed Payment Model 
 
                                                          
8   Although changing the face value of a currency seem similar to changing its yield, there is an 
important dissimilarity when effecting such a change as a policy lever. In normal CB operations, interest 
rates are typically adjusted in open market operations by changing their total balance. In this format, 
reducing the face value of CBDC implies the reduction of the CB´s liabilities without a corresponding fall 
in its assets and conversely, increasing the surplus (or reducing the deficit) of the consolidated fiscal 
account. 
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For this format, the current interbank payment system is replaced with a 
DLT-based infrastructure, so that the participants’ accounts in the Central 
Bank are replaced by CBDC wallets and the CB becomes merely another 
node in the network (see Figure 1), albeit with regulatory concessions― 
retrieve information on all the transactions as a market supervisor. CB can 
decide who participates in the system and is the sole cryptocurrency issuer. 
The “main advantages of this scenario lie, on the one hand, in the increased 
efficiency of the interbank payment system (i.e. cost reduction and speed 
increase)” (BIS, 2018). On the other hand, “in the greater resilience of a 
system of this type to cyberattacks since there is no vulnerable central point. 
The less efficient and insecure the system is, the greater the net benefits of 
adopting a CBDC” (BIS, 2019), making up for the implementation costs of 
new substructure, and adoption more likely.  
 
4.4.1. Impact and Consequences 
This format achieves what modern payments systems set out to do―P2P 
and more rapid payments, and involving fintech companies (or other NBFIs) 
which have the expertise but not necessarily focused in banking services. 
This would separate the financial business of credit and payments, where 
payments now can become commoditized through innovation for better 
services and use. Overall, all parties, including consumers, will benefit from 
faster, better and cheaper services from the efficiencies gained. 
The creation of a shared payments ledger system would allow for real-time 
and traceable transactional information about capital flows, which is 
progressing towards dynamic scrutinizing and better handling of systemic 
risk. Furthermore, the CB will have to compete with other digital 
currencies/ledgers9 in order to keep full-control (supervision) of the 
settlement system. In fostering competition, it will expand accessibility 
without incurring traditional payment infrastructure costs. The marginal cost 
of adding a new participant would be considerably lower which is done by 
simply adding a new node to the network. Allowing more players to have 
direct entry to the wholesale payments business would increase 
competition, but these benefits can only be realized at a high initial cost of 
application10 and subsequent maintenance costs after implementation 
(although these are lower than present systems). 
                                                          
9   In this research, other digital currencies are defined as those not issued by the CB, like Libra, Bitcoin, 
etc. 
10   Implementation costs include the development of new skills needed in CBs in order to be able to 
make full use of data stored in the ledger. 
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However, “Tier1 banks would lose their privileged role as ultimate settlers in 
CB accounts, and would lose part of the payment business in favor of Tier2 
banks, and all of them in favor of non-banks. Additionally, direct access to 
the wholesale payments settlement system would allow non-banks to 
provide end-to-end payment services and, as a consequence, increase their 
market share. Such new entrants might negatively impact the revenues of 
banks. However, the benefits in terms of efficiency, infrastructure costs 
savings, resilience, transparency and innovation could well outweigh such 
loss of revenue” (Cerqueira et al., 2017). 
With new competition, this format would drive “banks to focus on the credit 
business, where their expertise in risk management and the resources 
needed to enter into the business” are their competitive advantages. But 
looking at how banks have adopted fintechs to protect their market share, 
cooperative partnerships and collaborations between banks and the new 
techfin11 entrants or other fintech companies will naturally develop, to 
complement knowledge, processes and skills in payments and credit 
services. 
Operationally, the management of consumer liquidity via their CBDC wallets 
is a departure from the traditional overdraft sequence to topping up of 
wallets in a DL-based system. CB settlement accounts in RTGS today are 
quite similar, as they are “periodically pre-funded with accurate calculated 
funds enough to cover the payment needs”. However, in this situation, 
banks need to balance the amount of CB money both in its traditional form 
and in CBDC at all times. 
For central banks, the “utilization of a DL-based infrastructure allows for the 
full availability (365 days a year, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week) of the 
system, which can operate without interruption, unlike current RTGS 
systems, such as TARGET2 in Europe, which have predetermined operating 
schedules”. In addition, a decentralized system is much more robust to hacks 
and cyber-attacks than the current online systems because there is more 
than a single point of attack in order for it to fail. 
For banks, the main benefits would be similar to those of the CB: 24-7 
accessibility and security against threats and attacks, besides being faster 
and cheaper in the whole settlement process, and that includes its new 
infrastructure costs. Due to tougher competition, transaction fees will drop 
to more precisely indicate the marginal cost of verification related to 
payments. 
                                                          
11   Fintech is a financial technology company whereas techfin is a primarily technology company that is 
venturing into financial services. 
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From the payment aspect, business competitiveness would shift from merely 
payments itself to the evolution of additional consumer services. The 
transactional part of payments can be afforded by any financial service 
provider since they now have direct access to the decentralized settlement 
system. As such, the successful provider of the payment business would then 
seamlessly and intuitive create a strong user experience through wide-
ranging value-added services, primarily built upon the payment insights 
retrieved from transactional data. Despite not being able to access CBDCs 
directly in this scenario, end-users (i.e. the customers) would benefit from 
cheaper, safer and faster money transfers.  
A report from the IMF notes that “one area where there is a huge potential 
for efficiency gains is in cross–border payment systems” (IMF, 2017). They 
believe that “cryptocurrencies offer an opportunity for dramatic cost 
reductions, which may translate into faster and less expensive transactions, 
for instance in remittances”. Being national payment systems, CBDCs may 
compete with cryptocurrencies in remittance transactions, or develop 
interconnected payments systems between nations for cross–border 
transactions to vie for preference over privately-issued cryptocurrencies. 
 
4.4.2. Adoption Assessment 
This CBDC format is amply favorable because of its benefits and could serve 
as an intermediate step to start testing the more disruptive scenarios of 
formats 1, 2 and 3. CBs such as “the Bank of England are currently working 
on modernizing their RTGS systems, and a DL-based infrastructure is being 
seriously considered”, as reported by BBVA Research (Cerqueira et al., 
2017). 
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Further Analysis 
4.5. Countercyclical Measures and Fiscal Policy Interactions with CBDC 
In another study, Barrdear and Kumhof (2016) of the Bank of England 
investigated the properties of a specific format of CBDC (Format 3 discussed 
in section 4.3) which “can be held by the non-bank private sector“ (unlike 
reserves), that it is bears yield (unlike cash), and that it rivals the “internally 
created private bank-issued money”. Their quantity or price rules react to 
inflation, in the same way it responds to the policy rate12. Hence, the 
quantity and price rules for CBDCs have a “very similar potential for 
countercyclical policy responses to standard shocks” (discretionary 
monetary stimulus or money supply shock). The “choice between quantity 
and price rules must therefore mostly be based on the fact that price rules, 
as mentioned above, perform better under money demand shocks”. 
Barrdear and Kumhof (2016) also found that “the relative performance of 
countercyclical quantity and price rules depends critically on the elasticity of 
substitution between CBDC and bank deposits, with a lower elasticity 
implying that smaller quantity responses and larger interest rate responses 
to inflation are required to achieve the same degree of countercyclicality”.  
In order for the “CBDC price rule and countercyclical quantity rule” to be 
sufficiently effective, Barrdear and Kumhof held the assumptions that the 
steady state quantity of CBDC amounts to 30% of GDP (sufficient to render 
substantial withdrawals of CBDC possible “without hitting a ‘quantity zero 
lower bound’”), that the CBDC is used frequently enough by its prospective 
users, and that the “steady state efficiency gains of CBDC issuance” are 
sizeable over the expected scale measured. 
Within this model, Barrdear and Kumhof found that a “system of CBDC 
offers a number of clear macroeconomic advantages, including large steady 
state output gains of almost 3% for an injection of CBDC equal to 30% of 
GDP”, and considerable “gains in the efficacy of systematic or discretionary 
countercyclical monetary policy”. Their analysis suggests that the only 
restrictions required to obtain these gains are that an adequately large 
supply of CBDC is circulated in steady state, and that the central bank only 
utilizes the CBDC when it trades against government debt instruments. 
 
 
                                                          
12   They visualized that the “CBDC would be an economically relevant monetary aggregate as long as the 
quantity outstanding is sufficiently large and its substitutability with other monetary transactions media 
is sufficiently low”. 
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4.6. Further Economic Implication Analysis and Recommendations 
From the formats that have been ruminated, Format 4 (described in section 
4.4.) appears to be the least disruptive to the existing system. The benefits 
are extensive in terms of operations from the banking, payments and “huge 
potential for efficiency gains is in cross–border payment systems”. And 
rightly so, many central banks are at present looking into this particular 
format to venture and experiment with. In terms of ranking, Format 3 
(described in section 4.3.) would be recommended next, as it has the 
potential to generate steady state output and efficiency gains unique to the 
CBDC as a monetary policy tool albeit with certain essential conditions. 
Among the attractive advantages is its ability to overcome the ‘quantity zero 
lower bound’ issue. Formats 1 and 2 could be implemented at later stages 
after Formats 4 and 3. 
However, the interest rate as the pricing mechanism and policy lever here 
then requires a little more in-depth discussion, considering the Shariah 
perspective. It is intended to explain the Islamic financial perspective which 
effects a ban on interest, including interest rate as a pricing mechanism. The 
concern for justice and equity involves nondiscriminatory exchange and 
fairness in financial transactions, including getting the market prices right 
through proper pricing mechanisms so as to not suffer the consequences of 
mispricing. 
‘Getting the prices right’ means letting market forces function naturally to 
produce market prices that reflect all opportunity costs that correspond to 
them. John Maynard Keynes (1932) had already indicated that “the interest 
rate policy had deviated the true opportunity cost of financial resources”, 
and James Tobin (1969) pointed out that “there was no such thing as a 
‘market rate of interest’ in an environment in which policy drove the ‘market 
rate of interest’”. “Monetary policy had the ability”, Tobin argued, “to force 
a deviation between market valuation of capital and its replacement cost”. 
His “fundamental-valuation efficiency” concept, interpreted as “allocative 
efficiency”, would ascertain the opportunity cost of financial resources that 
guides and necessitates their worthiest uses. 
In ‘getting the prices right’ dogma, a market where prices were not allowed 
to reflect their opportunity cost, becomes repressive to market 
players―which “was the McKinnon-Shaw argument for liberalization of the 
financial sector of developing countries” (Mirakhor, 2017). Financial 
repression, the deviation of “administered interest rate” from the “market 
interest rate”, led to market distortions, which has resulted in poor savings, 
inadequate investments and stunted economic growth. In the subsequent 
decades of financial liberalization to chase economic prosperity, Mirakhor 
laments that “a basic question never asked was how and in what sense did 
Mohamed | Implementing a Central Bank Issued Digital Currency: Assessing the Shariah-compliant Format 
IJIEF: International Journal of Islamic Economics and Finance, 3(1), 51-74 | 71 
 
the ‘market rate of interest’ reflect the true opportunity cost of financial 
resources”.  
One of the central problems of major economies, according to Mirakhor, “is 
the uncoordinated and mismatched balance sheets of the real, financial, 
household and government sectors”. Ideally, the assumption is that the 
market would work freely to coordinate the balance sheets and allow for 
equilibrium to surface. Unfortunately, the current state of economics suffers 
from a runaway financial sector, which is decoupled from the real sector. In 
its current state, the economy only apportions a miniscule amount of market 
trades to capital formation in the real sector resulting in a real sector with 
corporations overflowing with cash, but not investing. With reduced 
investments, MSMEs become starved for financial resources, and unable to 
grow and survive, while government sectors amass huge debts to fund their 
programs, unable to coordinate its balance sheets. The market’s inability has 
spawned a “paper economy” without much connection to the real sector, 
when in fact, the economy needs a real sector rate of return to replace the 
mis-pricings of opportunity cost of financial resources in order to 
productively allow capital to circulate. 
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V. Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
5.1. Conclusion 
For CBDCs to be practical, it has to provide pragmatic implementable 
solutions that will solve existing problems that cannot be solved by current 
tools or instruments. Current policies and frameworks will remain ineffective 
to existing problems so long as fundamental flaws which are systemic are 
not rectified. They cannot be resolved by “patch” solutions which only treat 
symptoms (not the root) where increasingly outdated and flawed 
mechanisms have masked their compounding detrimental effects. DL-based 
solutions like the CBDC in its various formats offer alternatives in tackling 
some of these important issues as we work towards a freer marketplace, a 
more stable financial and considerably more prosperous economic system. 
 
5.2. Recommendations 
To possibly rectify and rise from a “paper economy” without much 
connection to the real sector, a properly-researched CBDC can at least 
enhance the effectiveness of the tools of monetary policy. Where the 
interest rate mechanism is no longer available to allocate (better said, 
misallocate) financial resources, as would be the case in Islamic finance, 
monetary policy becomes even more effective in inducing private sector 
portfolio adjustment as it relies on the rate of return to investment in the 
real sector of the economy (as the true opportunity cost of financial 
resources) to guide its policy actions. Such systemic change is required for a 
systemic problem that has gone on for far too long. 
For further research, central bank researchers and policy-makers can test 
these scenarios (CBDC formats) using the DSGE model since monetary DSGE 
models are widely used because they fit well with the such data well and 
they can be used to address important monetary policy questions 
(Christiano et al, 2010). Policy analyses with DSGE models requires data 
being assigned numerical values to model parameters. 
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